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INRE MARRIAGE OF MCDOLE: MODIFYING CHILD
CUSTODY BY IGNORING STATUTORY STANDARDS
Virginia A. Petersen
Abstract: In In re Marriage of McDole, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
modification of a parenting plan that changed the primary residential parent. By relying in
part on the mother's interference with visitation, the court not only undermined the important
policy underlying the modification statute of maximizing finality in custody determinations,
but it also failed to read the modification statute as a whole. The court also inappropriately
relied on the mother's move out of the state and continued conflict between the parents. The
court further failed to explicitly explain the legal bases for its decision, providing little
guidance for future interpretation of the modification statute.

Many experts have recognized that modification of a permanent
parenting plan or child custody decree' should be discouraged because it
can disrupt the continuity and stability of the child's environment.2 The
Washington Legislature responded to this concern and made
modification more difficult to obtain by imposing strict statutory
requirements. 3 In In re Marriage ofMcDole,4 the Washington Supreme
Court undermined this legislative action by affirming a modification.
The original dissolution decree in McDole had designated the mother as
the primary residential parent. In upholding a modification, the supreme
court inappropriately relied on the mother's interference with visitation,
her move to another state, and the continued conflict between the
parents. By relying in part on the mother's interference with visitation,
the court failed to read the modification statute as a whole and
undermined the statute's fundamental goal of protecting continuity and
stability in the child's environment. The court also ignored contempt
remedies and sanctions that must be used before resorting to
modification. By relying in part on the mother's move out of state, the
court violated the policy that punishment of the parent must not be
visited upon the child. The court further undermined the important
policy of finality in custody decisions by failing to clarify the legal bases
of its decision, providing little guidance to courts deciding future

1. The Parenting Act of 1987 replaced the terms "custody" and "visitation" with the terms
"parenting plan" and "residential schedule." Parenting Act of 1987, 1987 Wash. Laws 2015-2041
(codified in scattered sections of Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09 (1992)).
2. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
3. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260 (1992). See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
4. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993) (per curiam).
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modification claims.
Because visitation disputes are common, the
McDole decision could prompt a significant increase in modification
claims.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF WASHINGTON'S MODIFICATION
STATUTE

A.

The Modification StandardBefore the 1973 Statute

Prior to 1973, judges had broad discretion in modifying child custody
decrees. Former RCW 26.08.110, repealed in 1973, provided that
custody decrees could be "modified, altered and revised by the Court
from time to time as circumstances may require."5 Taiis statute provided
little guidance to courts about when to hear a modification case and
about what factors to consider when making a cuslody determination.
Thus, courts gradually developed general guidelines to use in such cases.
In order to grant a modification, courts had to find a material change in
circumstances concerning the welfare of the child and that the child's
welfare would be promoted by the modification.6 The best interests of
the child was the governing principle guiding these decisions.7 Appellate
courts deferred to the trial judge's determination of what was in the best
interests of the child, on the grounds that the trial judge had the
opportunity to personally observe parents and witnesses.8
Because there was little statutory guidance about what factors to
consider when deciding modification cases, decisions were often
subjective, reflecting the personal values or biases of the trial judge,
rather than reasoned precedent.9 Thus, prior to 1973, the outcome of
modification cases was difficult to predict.' Because each parent can
often make plausible arguments why it would be in the child's best

5. 1949 Wash. Laws 702.
6. Peugh v. Peugh, 67 Wash. 2d 469, 472, 408 P.2d 10, 12 (1965); Coldwater v. Coldwater, 65
Wash. 2d 941, 942, 400 P.2d 619, 620 (1965).
7. Dykes v. Dykes, 69 Wash. 2d 874, 876, 420 P.2d 861, 862 (1966); Shaffer v. Shaffer, 61 Wash.
2d 699, 702, 379 P.2d 995, 997 (1963).
8.Dykes, 69 Wash. 2d at 876,420 P.2d at 862.
9. Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 Yale L.J. 757, 762
(1985) (discussing problems with this "traditional standard" of modificaion); Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication:JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indetermi.zacy, 39 Law & Contemp.
Piobs. 226, 262-63 (1975) (discussing the best interests standard as an indeterminate standard that
makes the outcome of cases difficult to predict).
10. Mnookin, supranote 9.
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interests to be with him or her, the best interests standard, without more,
creates a greater incentive to litigate than a more determinate rule."
B.

The 1973 Modification Statute

In 1973, the Washington Legislature passed the Marriage Dissolution
Act, which provided statutory guidance in deciding modification cases.1 23
The statute was modeled on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA), and was designed to disfavor modification.1 4 The main goal of
this new statute was to maximize finality in custody awards.15 Finality in
custody is important because custodial changes are highly disruptive to
children. 6 Furthermore, exposing children to continual relitigation is
detrimental to the stability of their environment. 7 The statute attempted
to achieve this goal of finality by providing procedural safeguards and by
requiring the courts to follow more stringent standards in modification
decisions.
1. -ProceduralSafeguards and Strict Standards
The 1973 statute instituted procedural safeguards to prevent parties
from using questionable modification claims to harass the custodial
parent. 8 For example, RCW 26.09.270 requires a party seeking
modification of a custody decree to file and serve an affidavit setting
forth facts supporting the requested modification, along with the

11.

Id.
12. Marriage Dissolution Act of 1973, 1973 Wash. Laws 1215 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Wash. Rev. Code § 26).
13. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, 9A U.L.A. 628, Commissioner's Note (1987).
14. In re Marriage of Thompson, 32 Wash. App. 418, 421, 647 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1982); In re
Marriage of Roorda, 25 Wash. App. 849, 851, 611 P.2d 794, 795-96 (1980).
15. Id.
16. Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wash. App. 366, 368, 541 P.2d 996, 997 (1975).
17. In re Marriage of Murphy, 48 Wash. App. 196, 203, 737 P.2d 1319, 1323 (1987) (Green, J.,
dissenting). Green stated:
The policy reasons underlying RCW 26.09.260 and the presumption in favor of custodial
continuity and against modification are (1) to maximize finality of custody awards since
children and their parents should not be subjected to repeated litigation of the custody issues
determined in the original action; (2) to prevent "ping-pong" custody litigation since stability of
the child's environment is of utmost concern; and (3) to preserve the basic policy of custodial
continuity since custodial changes are viewed as highly disruptive to the child.
See also Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 628, 585 P.2d 130, 132 (1978).
18. In re Marriage of Roorda, 25 Wash. App. 849, 851-52, 611 P.2d 794,796 (1980).
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modification motion.19 Unless the court finds the affidavit of the moving
party has established "adequate cause" for hearing the motion, the court
must deny the motion. 20 In In re Marriage of Roorda, the court of
appeals interpreted "adequate cause" to require more than prima facie
allegations that, if proven, might permit inferences sufficient to establish
grounds for modification. 2' Before a hearing on the merits can take
place, the petitioner must allege actual facts that, if true, would overcome
the presumption of custodial continuity.'
In In re Marriage of
Mangiola, the court of appeals emphasized the importance of protecting
the custodial parent from harassment and providing st~ability for the child
by imposing a heavy burden on a petitioner that must be satisfied before
the court convenes a hearing.23 The statute also discourages frivolous
claims by requiring the court to assess attorneys' fees and court costs
against the petitioner if it finds that the motion to modify was brought in
bad faith. 24
In addition to procedural safeguards, the 1973 statute instituted strict
guidelines for modification after adequate cause is found.' The statute
prohibits the court from modifying the prior custody decree or parenting
plan unless it finds a substantial change in circumstances of either the
child or the custodial parent.26 The court must make this assessment only
on the basis of facts that arose since the prior decree or that were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree.27 Only if the
original decree was a result of a default judgment or an agreement
between the parties can pre-decree facts be considered in a modification
28
proceeding.

19. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.270 (1992).
20. Id.
21. In re Marriage of Roorda, 25 Wash. App. 849, 851-52,611 P.2d 794,796 (1980).
22. Id.; In re Marriage of Mangiola, 46 Wash. App. 574, 578-79, 732 P.2d 163, 165 (1987).
23. Roorda, 25 Wash. App. at 851-52, 611 P.2d at 796; Mangiola,46 Wash. App. at 578-79, 732
P.2d at 165.
24. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(5) (1992).
25. 1973 Wash. Laws 1227 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260 (1992)).
26. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260 (1992). A change in the non-custodial parent's circumstances
is not a basis for modification. Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 629, 585 P.2d 130, 132
(1978).
27. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(1) (1992).
28. In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 598-99, 617 P.2d 1032, 1035-36 (1980)
(holding that when a dissolution is uncontested, pre-decree facts can be considered in a modification
proceeding); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 14 Wash. App. 194, 196-97, 539 P.2d 699, 701 (1975)
(holding that because the original custody decree was obtained by defaalt, the court can consider
facts that existed prior to the original decree).
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In addition to finding a substantial change in circumstances, the court
must find that the modification is in the best interests of the child and is
necessary to the best interests of the child.29 Thus, a change in
circumstances is not, by itself, enough to permit a modification. The
court must find that the change of circumstances requires a modification
to protect the best interests of the child."
Although these standards did not present a major shift from the
common law, the 1973 statute went even further. It provided that the
court must find one of three additional prerequisites before granting a
modification. The court may not grant a modification unless it finds: 1)
that the parents agree to the modification; 2) that the child has been
integrated into the family of the petitioner with the custodial parent's
consent; or 3) that "the child's present environment is detrimental to the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child ...""
The third prerequisite has two separate prongs. The court must first
determine if the child's present environment is detrimental to the child's
physical, mental, or emotional health. The present environment at issue
in this balancing test is the custodial environment named in the original
custody decree.32 Second, the court must balance the harm from the
present environment against the harm likely to be caused by a change in
environment. The court can grant a modification only if the advantage of
the change outweighs the harm of the change.33
Case law is ambiguous concerning whether actual harm must be
shown or whether potential harm is enough. The Washington Court of
Appeals has held that the third prerequisite requires a showing of actual
harm.34 Scholarly criticism has suggested that granting a modification
based on potential future harm undermines the basic policy of the

29. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(1) (1992).
30. George v. Helliar, 62 Wash. App. 378,382, 814 P.2d 238, 241 (1991).
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(2) (1992).
32. George, 62 Wash. App. at 383, 814 P.2d at 241.
33. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(2)(c) (1992).
34. Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wash. App. 366, 541 P.2d 996 (1975) (reversing the trial court's
modification where the mother was found to be immature, emotionally unstable, and mentally
unbalanced, because there was no evidence that this negatively affected the children); Wildermuth v.
Wildermuth, 14 Wash. App. 442, 542 P.2d 463 (1975) (reversing the trial court's modification,
because there was no showing that the mother's cohabitation with a man who was not her husband
was harmful to the children and the trial court's prediction of probable harm to the children was not
enough to justify a modification).
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statute.35 In In re Marriage of Timmons, howev, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld a modification based on evidence of potential
harm.36
While the court did not specifically hold that evidence of
potential harm is sufficient, its result appears to assume that premise.
2.

The UnderlyingPolicy ofFinalityin Custody Decisions

The 1973 modification statute embraces the policy that finality in
custody decisions is an important factor in providing children with
stability and continuity. The UMDA, which served as the model for the
Washington statute, was governed by the belief that finality in custody
decrees is of utmost importance. The UMDA drafters relied in part on
the wide consensus of experts that "insuring the decree's finality is more
important than determining which parent should be the custodian."3 7
Many experts agree that stability and continuity in the child's
relationships are crucial to the child's well-being. 8 Laws that make it
easy for parents to repeatedly challenge custody decrees threaten that
continuity and stability that are central to the chi.d's development.39
The 1973 statute recognized the value of continuity and stability by
requiring
courts to focus on the likely harm caused by the modification
40
itself.

35. K. Kendall Heine, Modifying Child Custody Awards: A SubstantialChange Underthe Illinois
Marriageand Dissolution of MarriageAct, 1980 S. Ill. U. L.J. 439, 454-56 (1980) (arguing that
allowing trial courts to speculate about the possibility of future harm undermines the goal of making
modifications more difficult to obtain).
36. In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980) (holding that the trial
court findings that the mother was unstable and insecure were sufficient evidence of a "potential
harm" to the children and satisfied the criteria for modification under RCV1 26.09.260(l)(c)).
37. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, 9A U.L.A. 628, 629, Commissioner's Note (1987)
(citing Andrew S. Watson, The Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody FollowingDivorce,
21 Syracuse L. Rev. 55 (1969)).
38. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 265:
This proposition cannot be proven beyond any doubt by existing empirical studies, and accurate
predictions for a particular child about the effects of the lack of stability are beyond existing
techniques. But a substantial and impressive consensus exists among psychologists and
psychiatrists that disruption of the parent-child relationship carries significant risks.
See Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 31-35 (19791; Heine, supra note 35, at
450; Watson, supra note 37, at 64; Wexler, supra note 9, at 800.
39. Goldstein, supranote 38, at 37-39; Watson, supranote 37, at 64.
40. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act §409, 9A U.L.A. 628, Commissioner's Note (1987) ("Any
change in the child's environment may have an adverse effect, even if the noncustodial parent would
better serve the child's interest.').
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Experts also believe that the constant threat of relitigation inhibits the
custodial parent's relationship with the child by causing both parent and
child to live in fear of possible modifications." If parents are constantly
aware of the legal threat to custody, they may lose "spontaneity" in
parenting.42 Better parenting will result if custodial parents can be secure
in their custodial role, without feeling the need to constantly anticipate
the court's reaction to their parenting activities and to conform their
behavior accordingly.4 3
Furthermore, defending legal actions for
modification can burden the custodial parent financially.' The 1973
statute addresses these problems through its heightened standards for
modification4 5 as well as through the procedural safeguards that
discourage claims brought in bad faith or with insufficient evidence.46
Another important justification for finality in modification cases is
family autonomy. The initial divorce and custody decision creates a new
post-divorce familial unit comprised of the custodial parent and child.
This new family is entitled to the same amount of protection from state
interference as a pre-divorce two-parent family.4 7 Consequently, the
state should not be allowed to remove the child from the custodial
parent's home absent a finding of serious endangerment to the child.4
The justification for the state's initial intrusion, the parents' lack of
agreement,4 9 no longer applies. The fact that a couple divorces should
not allow the state to use a "shattered family" rationale to justify
indefinite jurisdiction over the new family unit.5"
C.

1989 Amendments Addressed Visitation Interference

One question that frequently arises in actions for modification is
whether one parent's interference with the other's visitation rights is
41. Watson, supranote 37, at 63.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also Goldstein, supra note 37, at 117.
44. Watson, supra note 38, at 63.
45. See supranotes 25-33 and accompanying text.
46. See supranotes 18-24 and accompanying text.
47. Wexler, supra note 9, at 816. See Nancy B. Shemow, Recognizing ConstitutionalRights of
Custodial Parents: The Primacy of the Post-Divorce Family in Child Custody Modification
Proceedings,35 UCLA L. Rev. 677,708-09 (1988).
48. Id. See Goldstein, supra note 38, at 35 ("all child placements, except where specifically
designed for brief temporary care, shall be as permanent as the placement of a newborn with its
biological parents").
49. Wexler, supra note 9, at 807-08.
50. Id. at 817. See Shernow, supranote 47, at 708-09.
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sufficient grounds for ordering a modification. In 1989, the Washington
Legislature passed a bill, amending sections of the Marital Dissolution
Act, to address this question." The new legislation added a fourth
alternative prerequisite for modification that gives courts guidance on
when interference with visitation can be a basis for modification. 2 The
bill also added provisions for enforcement of the residential schedule and
required every parenting plan to contain a warning to parents about the
consequences of non-compliance. 3
Even before the Marital Dissolution Act of 1973, the supreme court
had repeatedly held that a parent's willful violation of the decree should
not be a determining factor in custody cases.54 The underlying rationale
of these decisions was that the welfare of the child, rather than
punishment of parents, should be the paramount concern.5 The original
Marital Dissolution Act did not specifically address whether violating the
decree by interfering with visitation rights should be grounds for
modification. The Act did, however, give the courts broad discretion in
punishing the noncomplying parent through contempt proceedings and
other means.56 Courts continued to hold that a violation of the decree
alone was not justification for a modification.5 7 The supreme court
affirmed this rule and its policy in Schuster v. Schuster, holding that
interfering with the noncustodial father's visitation rights was not by
itself a sound reason to modify the custody decree. 8

51. 1989 Wash. Laws 1580 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Wash. Rev. Code §
26.09 (1992)).
52. 1989 Wash. Laws 1583 (codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(2)(d) (1992)).
53. 1989 Wash. Laws 1583 (codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.165 (1992)).
54. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 61 Wash. 2d 699, 379 P.2d 995 (1963); Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Wash.
2d 244, 352 P.2d 179 (1960); Malfait v. Malfait, 54 Wash. 2d 413, 341 P.2d 154 (1959); Annest v.
Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62,298 P.2d 483 (1956).
55. Shaffer, 61 Wash. 2d at 699, 379 P.2d at 995; Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d at 244, 352 P.2d at
179; Malfait, 54 Wash. 2d at 413,341 P.2d at 154, Annest,49 Wash. 2d a- 62,298 P.2d at 483.
56. 1987 Wash. Laws 2025 (repealed 1989) ("the court has broad discretion to punish the conduct
by a punitive award or other remedies, including civil or criminal contempt, and may consider the
conduct in awarding attorneys' fees").
57. Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wash. App. 366, 368-69, 541 P.2d 956, 997 (1975) (holding that
interfering with the visitation rights of the father is not by itself a sound reason to modify the
decree).
58. Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 630, 585 P.2d 130, 133 (1978). In affirming this rule
the Court relied in part on a section of the Marital Dissolution Act that dealt with initial custody
decisions. Id. Former RCW 26.09.190 provided that "[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a
proposed guardian that does not affect the welfare of the child." 1973 Wash. Laws 1225 (repealed
1987).
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In 1989, the Legislature narrowed the courts' discretion in dealing
with parents who did not comply with the dissolution decree or parenting
plan. It passed a bill amending the Marriage Dissolution Act to spell out
specific consequences for a parent who has not complied with the
residential provisions in the parenting plan and has been found in
contempt of court. On the first finding of contempt, the noncomplying
parent must: 1) make up for any visitation time that the moving parent
missed as a result of the noncomplying parent; 2) pay all court costs and
attorneys' fees incurred due to the noncompliance, and reasonable
expenses incurred in locating or returning the child; and 3) pay a civil
penalty not less than $100 to the moving party.59 The court may order
the parent to be imprisoned for no more than 180 days if the parent is
able to comply but unwilling to do so. 6 1 On a second finding of
contempt for noncompliance with a residential plan, the parent must
provide the noncustodial parent twice the amount of time missed due to
the noncompliance. 6' Additionally, the civil penalty must not be less
than $250, although expenses and possible imprisonment remain the
62
same.
The 1989 bill also clarified when interference with visitation can
appropriately be considered in granting a modification.63 Specifically,
the court must retain the current residential schedule unless, as the new
fourth prerequisite states, the nonmoving parent has been held in
contempt of court at least twice within three years for failure to comply
with residential provisions in the parenting plan.' Thus, this amendment
implicitly allows courts to modify based on interference with visitation
only if the court has first used the other available remedies.
This same bill added a new provision requiring that all court orders
containing parenting plan provisions include a warning to parents about
the consequences of violating the residential provisions." The statute
specifically spells out the proper language, warning parents that a
violation of the residential provisions with actual knowledge of its terms
is punishable by a citation for contempt of court.66

59. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.160(2)(b) (1992).
60. Id.
61. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.160(3) (1992).
62. Id.
63. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(2)(d) (1992).
64. Id.
65. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.165 (1992).
66. Id.
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INRE MARRIAGE OFMCDOLE: THE BATTLE OVER JOEY

Cynthia Hatch and James McDole were married on February 22,
1986, and had a child, Joseph McDole (Joey) on January 12, 1987.67
Their marriage was dissolved on November 23, 1988.6" Both parents
petitioned to become Joey's primary residential parent. The court
designated Cynthia the primary residential parent because she had been
Joey's primary caregiver.6 9 James was awarded visitation of two days a
week, plus additional vacations and holidays. 70 Although the court orally
enjoined the parents from taking the child from Walla Walla County
without the court's permission, the dissolution decree itself contained no
such restriction.7' Although James had no problems visiting Joey
immediately after the decree, a dispute arose over visitation with
Cynthia's son from a previous marriage, also named James.72 Once the
court ordered scheduled visitation with the child, however, Cynthia
complied with the order and did not interfere.7
On March 9, 1990, Cynthia moved to Utah to marry Lance Hatch.
She consulted her attorney, who reviewed the dissolution decree and
advised her that there was no prohibition on removirg her child from the
state.74 She moved to Utah with Joey without personally notifying
James.75 Her attorney, however, sent him a letter, received by him on
March 9, notifying him of the move and suggesting a revised visiting
schedule.7 6

67. In re Marriage of McDole, 67 Wash. App. 884, 885, 841 P.2d 770, 771 (1992), rev'd per
curiam, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 886, 841 P.2d at 771.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 886, 841 P.2d at 771-72.
75. Id. Cynthia testified that she did not notify James of her plars to move and get married
because she feared that he would try to stop her and harass her. In re Marriage of McDole, 122
Wash. 2d 604, 607, 859 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1993) (per curiam). It is important to note that in the
initial dissolution proceeding, the court found that he had harassed her in the past. Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law at 3, In re Marriage ofMcDole, (Walla Walla Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 1988) (No.
88-3-00084-5). In the dissolution decree, the court expressly ordered James to refrain from
continuing to harass her. Decree of Dissolution of Marriage at 5, In re Marriage of McDole, (Walla
Walla Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 1988) (No. 88-3-00084-5).
76. McDole, 67 Wash. App. at 886, 841 P.2d at 772.
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On March 12, 1990, James filed a motion to modify the dissolution
decree and designate him the primary residential parent.77 He also filed a
motion for temporary custody and requested an order requiring Cynthia
to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating the
court's order by removing Joey from Walla Walla County.78 The hearing
for this motion was scheduled for March 23. On March 15, Cynthia
moved to continue argument on the motion because she was getting
married and would not be able to appear.79 The judge postponed ruling
on the continuance and ordered Cynthia to provide an address and a
telephone number where Joey could be reached.80 On March 19, the
judge denied the continuance because only a business telephone number
had been provided, but indicated that the court might reconsider the
continuance if Cynthia provided a residential telephone number.8 '
Cynthia provided a residential telephone number for Joey but the hearing
proceeded as scheduled. 2 Cynthia did not appear for this hearing, and
her attorney renewed her request for a continuance. Concluding that
Cynthia was not being candid with the court, the trial court noted that
this was "too much messing around" and granted temporary custody to
James. 3 Cynthia complied and transferred Joey into James's custody on
March 31 .4 She was not held in contempt of court.8
On July 2, 1990, the court heard oral argument on James's motion to
modify the parenting plan. Richard Garcia, a social worker, testified
through deposition that he had evaluated Joey following his return from
Utah and found that Joey may have been injured by the move." His
opinion was based on the fact that Joey once cried when talking to James
from Utah and cried at night for two weeks after returning to Walla
Walla."7 Thus, it is not clear whether Richard Garcia was referring to
harm from Joey's move to Utah or from his return to his father's home in
Walla Walla.

77. McDole, 122 Wash. 2d at 606, 859 P.2d at 1240.
78. McDole, 67 Wash. App. at 886, 841 P.2d at 772.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id at 886-87, 841 P.2d 772.
82. Id. at 887, 841 P.2d at 772.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 607, 859 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1993).
McDole, 67 Wash. App. at 889 n.1, 841 P.2d at 773 n.1.
Id. at 887, 841 P.2d at 772.
Id.
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The trial court found that Cynthia was "resistive" to visitation and that
this resistance represented a substantial change in circumstances."8 It
found that Cynthia would continue to interfere with Joey's contact with
his father and, therefore, continuing to live with Cynthia would be
detrimental to Joey." The court found that modification was necessary
to serve the best interests of the child and that the harm likely to be
caused by the change of environment was outweighed by the advantage
of the change." Based on these findings, the court modified the decree
to designate James the primary residential parent.
The court was unclear whether its finding that Cyr.thia was resistive to
visitation meant that she had actually interfered with visitation or that she
was just likely to interfere in the future. This confusion is intensified by
another finding that, since the initial decree, "the only problems between
the parties" were James's difficulties in securing visitation rights with
Cynthia's son from a previous marriage.9" Yet another finding states that
the father was unable to contact Joey between March 9 and March 20
because of his move to Utah.92 Thus, the only evidence of interference
with James's visitation with Joey cited by the trial court is James's
inability to contact his son after the move to Utah. The trial court did not
find that Cynthia violated the decree by moving to Utah with Joey.
93
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's modification order.
The court properly noted that a trial court should not modify a permanent
residential schedule unless it finds the threshold requirements that a
substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the
nonmoving party and that the modification is necessary to serve the best
interests of the child.94 In addition, both parts of the third prerequisite
must be satisfied. The court must find that the child's present
environment is detrimental to the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health and that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment
is outweighed by the advantage of the change to the child.9" The court of
appeals then held that the evidence did not support a finding of a
88. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, In re Marriage ofvfcDole (,Valla Walla Super.
Ct. Sept. 13, 1990) (No.-3-00084-5) [hereinafter, Findings].
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
93. In re Marriage of McDole, 67 Wash. App. 884, 841 P.2d 770 (1992), rev'dpercuriam, 122
Wash. 2d 604, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993).
94. Id. at 888, 841 P.2d at 773.
95. Id.
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substantial change in circumstances.96 It further found that there was no
evidence from which the trial court could find that Joey's environment
while living with his mother was detrimental to his physical, mental, or
emotional health.97 The court concluded that modification of custody
cannot be used to punish a parent for wrongful conduct. 9' Instead,
interference with visitation should be grounds for contempt under RCW
26.09.160. 9
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the trial court's judgment. It held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that: 1) there had been a substantial change
in circumstances; 2) the child's environment was detrimental to his
mental health; and 3) the modification was necessary to the child's best
interests.'
Thus, the court found sufficient evidence to order a
modification of custody under RCW 26.09.260. The court failed to
discuss, however, the balancing test required by the third prerequisite
that the advantage of the change in environment must outweigh the harm.
The court listed the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and
ultimate ruling.' 0' It noted evidence that Cynthia had obstructed James's
visitation rights and left the state with Joey without notifying James.
Additionally she had been slow to comply with the court's orders to
supply James with a telephone number for Joey. The court also noted
that a counselor had testified that Cynthia's behavior was harmful to
Joey and that she would probably continue to interfere with visitation in
the future. It noted that the trial court had orally warned the parties at the
initial custody hearing that it would find continued conflict detrimental
to the child's best interests. Based on this evidence, the court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody.0 2

96. Id. at 889, 841 P.2d at 773.
97. Id. at 890, 841 P.2d at 774.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 890, 841 P.2d at 774.
100. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 611, 859 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1993) (per
curiam).
101. Id. at 610-11,859 P.2d at 1243.
102. Id.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
PARENTING PLAN
The supreme court erred in affirming the trial court's modification of
the parenting plan. Interference with visitation should not be considered
a substantial change in circumstances. More importantly, by resting on
the third prerequisite of the modification statute which requires finding a
detriment in the child's present environment and a subsequent balancing
of that harm against the advantage of the change, the court failed to read
the modification statute as a whole and ignored the 1989 amendments,
which offer a way to coerce and punish parents who do not comply with
the residential provisions without affecting the child. By allowing
modification in this case, the court undermined the important policy of
promoting continuity and stability in the child's environment by
maximizing finality in custody decrees. The court also undermined the
policy that punishment of the parent should not be visited upon the child.
Finally, the opinion has left Washington trial courts with little guidance
on how to decide future modification cases.
The CourtErredin FindingThatResistance to Visitation
Constitutes a Substantial Change in Circumstances.

A.

To prevail in an action for a modification, the petitioner must first
establish the existence of a substantial change in the circumstances of
either the child or nonmoving parent since the original decree. Althoiu"
it was not apparent from the supreme court opinion, the trial court
findings clearly stated that Cynthia's "resistance" to James's visitation
rights constituted the "substantial change in circumstances"' 3 that is
required by the statute."° Relying solely on interference with visitation
as a substantial change in circumstances, however, is contrary to prior
case law.
Although interfering with visitation arguably affects the welfare of the
child by disrupting the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent,
Washington courts have held that interference with visitation or violating
a custody decree is not enough to show a substantial change in
circumstances. In Anderson v. Anderson, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's transfer of custody from the mother to the father because
there was no substantial change of circumstances in the environment of

103. Findings,supranote 88, at 2.
104. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
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the custodial parent. 0 5 The court found no substantial change even
though there was evidence that the mother had interfered with the
father's visitation rights. Furthermore, in Schuster v. Schuster, the
supreme court held that violation of a custody decree does not constitute
a substantial change in circumstances. 0 6 While these courts held that
interference with visitation or violating a decree may not alone constitute
a change in circumstances, they implied that interference can be
considered if there are other factors indicating a substantial change. The
trial court in McDole, however, relied solely on Cynthia's resistance to
visitation in finding a substantial change in circumstances. Thus, by
reinstating the trial court judgment in McDole, the supreme court ignored
these precedents.
B.

In Findingthat the Third PrerequisiteHadBeen Met, the Court
FailedTo Construethe Statute as a Whole.

In addition to finding a substantial change in circumstances, the court
must find one of four prerequisites before granting a modification." 7
The trial court found that the third prerequisite, detriment in the child's
present environment that outweighs the harm of a custodial modification,
had been met by finding that Cynthia's interference with visitation would
be detrimental to Joey. In affirming the trial court's holding, the
supreme court failed to construe the modification statute as a whole.
In determining that the third prerequisite had been met, the trial court
found that Cynthia "is desirous of and will take actions that will limit the
child's contact with the father to the extent that the environment for the
child would be detrimental if the child were to remain with the
mother." " ' This finding seems to predict future behavior of Cynthia and
thus recognizes a potential harm. The trial court did not explicitly find
that her past actions caused any detriment to the child. Relying on
potential harm rather than actual harm seems consistent with the supreme
court ruling in Timmons."0 9 The supreme court, however, has never

105. Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wash. App. 366, 369, 541 P.2d 996, 997 (1975).
106. Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 627-29, 585 P.2d 130, 131-32 (1978). The custodial
mothers in this case involving two families violated a provision in the decree prohibiting them from
living together. Id.
107. See supranotes 31-33, 64-65 and accompanying text.
108. Findings,supranote 88, at 2.
109. In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 601, 617 P.2d 1032, 1036-37 (1980). See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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expressly held that potential harm is sufficient,"' and doing so would
undercut the modification statute's important poli-y of maximizing
finality by discouraging modifications."'
Even if it were proper to recognize potential harm under the
modification statute, it was improper to consider interference with
visitation absent any findings of contempt. Courts mu~st construe statutes
as a whole and read each provision in relation to the other provisions."'
Furthermore, courts must consider the entire sequence of statutes relating
to the same subject matter." 3 In 1989, the Legislature amended the
modification statute to give courts guidance on when interference with
visitation is proper grounds for modification."' The third prerequisite,
requiring a finding of detriment and a balancing of the harm of the
change against the advantage of the change, must be read in conjunction
with the fourth prerequisite, requiring two findings of contempt in three
years for a modification.
The 1989 amendment strikes a balance between two competing
policies. First, punishment for parental misconduct should not be visited
on children," 5 and second, repeatedly obstructing a child's contact with
the noncustodial parent is not in the best interests of the child." 6 The
1989 amendment added the fourth prerequisite allowing interference
with visitation as grounds for modification when a parent has been held
in contempt of court at least twice in three years for noncompliance with
the residential provisions. Thus, the amendment provides important
guidance to trial courts so that they do not substitute punishment of a
parent for the best interests of the child.
If Cynthia did in fact violate the residential provisions, the court
should have used the contempt statute to coerce compliance" 7 before
110. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
111. Heine, supra note 35.
112. Impecoven v. Dep't of Revenue, 120 Wash. 2d 357, 363, 841 P.2d 752, 754 (1992) (citing
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash. 2d 128, 134, 814 P.2d 629, 631 (1991)); Human Rights
Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. No. 30, 97 Wash. 2d 118, 121,641 P.2d 163, 164 (1982).
113. In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wash. 2d 183, 189, 634 P.2d 498, 502 (1981).
114. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.260(l)(d) (1992). See supranotes 64-65 and accompanying text.
The amendment specifies that a modification can be granted if the custodial parent has been held in
contempt of court twice in three years for violating residential provisions.
115. See supranote 54-55 and accompanying text.
116. Lawrence A. Goldman, Tortious Interference with Visitation Rights: A New and Important
Remedy for Non-CustodialParents,20 J.Marshall L. Rev. 307, 310 (1986); Watson, supranote 37,
at 85.
117. Cynthia was never held in contempt. Supra note 86. Although she may have violated the
residential provisions by preventing James from visiting Joey for the two weeks they were in Utah
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modifying the residential schedule. The Legislature did not leave the
courts without power to punish and coerce parents who interfere with
visitation. As noted earlier, the Legislature in the same bill detailed how
the courts should treat complaints of visitation interference." 8 This is a
sensible approach that instructs the courts to use the contempt
proceedings outlined in RCW 26.09.160 to admonish the noncomplying
parent and to warn that parent about the further consequences, for parent
and child alike, of continued interference. Thus, the court is able to
educate the parent and attempt to enforce compliance through less drastic
means before resorting to modification, with its emotional consequences
to the child. Furthermore, by demanding that lost time be made up and
costs reimbursed, the statute attempts to place the noncustodial parent in
the condition he or she was in before the interference occurred.
C.

Removing the Childfrom the State Should Not Have Been Grounds
for Modification.

In affirming the trial court's order for modification, the supreme court
relied in part on evidence that Cynthia left the state with Joey after
denying that she was leaving. This was an inappropriate factor to
consider in this case. Although the trial judge orally prohibited the
parents from taking the child out of the state, the initial divorce decree
contained no such prohibition. In In re Rankin, the supreme court
recognized that absent an express prohibition in the decree, the custodial
parent may remove the child from the state." 9 Furthermore, other cases
have held that a judge's oral opinion is not part of the decree or

and did not immediately comply with the court order to provide a residential phone number, these
incidents themselves do not constitute contempt. An order of contempt must be in writing to be in
effect. State v. Judge Noe, 78 Wash. 2d 484, 488, 475 P.2d 787, 790 (1970). Thus, Cynthia cannot
be considered to have been held in contempt as the modification statute requires.
118. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.160 (1992). See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. The
courts can coerce the parent into compliance through imprisonment and fines. The statute also
provides a remedy for the parent who has lost visiting time with the child by requiring that any lost
time be made up through additional visitation and that the costs incurred from the misconduct be
reimbursed by the noncomplying parent.
119. In re Rankin, 76 Wash. 2d 533, 536, 458 P.2d 176, 178 (1969). Accord Ehrich v. Ehrich, 7
Wash. App. 275, 278,499 P.2d 216, 216 (1972) ("the removal of a child to another state by a parent
to whom custody has been awarded is not a violation of a decree awarding visitation rights to the
other parent in the absence of a prohibition in the decree to the contrary"); Sanges v. Sanges, 44
Wash. 2d 35, 37, 265 P.2d 278, 279 (1953).
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judgment. 2 ' Accordingly, the supreme court should not have enforced
the prohibition against removing Joey from the state.
If a trial court believes it necessary to prohibit parents from moving
out of the state, it should do so explicitly in the written decree. A written
decree ensures that parents have adequate notice of what is expected of
them and that counsel have an accurate and rational basis for advising a
client. Requiring parents to remember the oral opinions given at often
emotional dissolution proceedings is unrealistic and unfair. Cynthia had
her attorney examine the decree to determine whether she could legally
move out of the state with the child. No case law obligates a party to
follow an oral statement by the court rather than the decree. In fact, case
law says precisely the opposite.'
Even if the court considered her action to be a violation of the decree,
however, such a violation would not be an appropriate basis for a
modification. Instead, as with any other violation, punishment should
be sought through contempt proceedings rather than modification. Such
treatment would accord with both the strong policy against using
modification to punish a parent" and Washington precedent. In In re
Marriage of Murphy, the parents had joint custody with the child's
residential time alternating weekly between the parents."2 In direct
violation of the custody decree, the mother moved out of the state with
the child without notifying the father of their whereabouts until several
weeks later. 24 The court of appeals found that the mother's move with
the child constituted a substantial change in circumstances and warranted
a modification of the joint custody arrangement, which was unworkable
given the increased distance between the parents' hcmes."2 ' The court,
however, did not change custody to punish the mother for removing the
child from the state. To the contrary, the court granted the mother sole
custody of the child even though she had left the state in violation of the

120. Marsh v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 57 Wash. App. 610, 618, 789 P.2d 792, 796
(1990) (holding that the court's oral opinion is not part of the judgment because it does not meet the
requirements of CR 54(a) that it be reduced to writing and signed by the judge); In re Marriage of
Pratt, 99 Wash. 2d 905, 910, 665 P.2d 400, 403 (1983) ("Courts speak through their judgments and
decrees, not their oral statements or written opinions."); Fosbre v. State, 70 Wash. 2d 578, 584-85,
424 P.2d 901,904 (1967).
121. Marsh, 57 Wash. App. at 618, 789 P.2d at 796; Pratt,99 Wash. 2d at 910, 665 P.2d at 403;
Fosbre,70 Wash. 2d at 584-85, 424 P.2d at 904.
122. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
123. In re Marriage of Murphy, 48 Wash. App. 196, 197,737 P.2d 1319, 1320 (1987).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 199, 737 P.2d at 1320-21.
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decree, because that result was in the child's best interests. 6 Thus, even
in a case in which the court held that moving out of state with the child
violated the decree and constituted a substantial change in circumstances,
it maintained its policy of not letting the violation be a per se grounds for
determining custody.
Furthermore, prior to the current modification and contempt statutes,
courts adhered to the policy that modification should not be used to
punish parents who moved in violation of the decree. The facts in
Shaffer v. Shaffer, were similar to the facts in McDole, in that the mother
was awarded custody of the child in the initial determination and later
moved out of the state with the child to remarry. 7 The father petitioned
for a custody modification based on her violation of the decree. 8 The
court held that there was no basis for a modification, because a willful
violation of a court decree cannot, per se, justify a change of custody. 9
Since there was no evidence of any other harm to the child from living
with his mother, the court held that it was in the best interests of the child
to stay with his mother. Thus, even before the current statutes, the courts
had held that violation of the decree by moving was not a sufficient basis
for modification. The current statutes clearly reinforced the courts'
policy and were not intended to alter that policy. 3 '
While the supreme court in McDole seemed to have rested in part on
Cynthia's removal of the child from the state, it is important to note that
the trial court did not find that she had violated the decree by moving.
The trial court was concerned with her move to Utah only because it
interfered with the father's visitation by depriving him of contact with
the child for ten days. 3 ' As discussed above, however, evidence of
interference with visitation that has not resulted in at least two contempt
decrees in three years is an inappropriate basis for modification.'3 2

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. 199, 737 P.2d at 1320-21.
Shaffer v. Shaffer, 61 Wash. 2d 699, 699-700,379 P.2d 995,996 (1963).
Id.
Id. at 703, 379 P.2d at 997.
See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.

131. Findings,supranote 88 at 2. See supranotes 92-93 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
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D. ParentalConflict Should Not Have Been Consideredas a Basisfor
Modification.
In upholding the modification, the supreme court noted that the trial
judge had orally warned the parents at the time of dissolution that
continued parental conflict would be considered detrimental to the
child's best interests in any future custody proceedings.'
Thus, the
court seemed to rely in part on the continued conflict between the parents
and its harmful effects on the child.
34
Many experts agree that parental conflict is detrimental to children.
It is difficult for children to maintain positive relationships with two
parents who are in conflict with each other.135 Parental conflict creates
loyalty conflicts within the child, causing the child to feel that he or she
cannot be close to one parent without jeopardizing the relationship with
the other parent. 3 6 There is also evidence that continued conflict
between parents
creates greater difficulties in the child's adjustment after
37
divorce.
the
Still, parental conflict should not have been considered in this case
because it was known to the trial court at the time of the original custody
decision. In a modification case, the court may consider only facts that
have arisen since the initial custody decision and that were unknown to
the trial court at the time of the initial decision.138 The fact that the trial
judge was concerned about the parental conflict and warned about its
effects in the initial proceeding indicates that he was aware of the
ongoing conflict when making his initial custody determination.
Even if the parental conflict were a new fact in the case and were
found to be detrimental to the child, it would not necessarily pass the
balancing test. When conflict between parents is considered detrimental,
it does not necessarily follow that living with the primary residential
parent is detrimental, because the conflict is a result of the behavior of

133. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 610-11, 859 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1993) (per
curiam).
134. Mara Quint Berke, In re Marriageof Birnbaum:Modifying Child Custody Arrangements by
Ignoring the Rules of the Game, 24 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 467, 505 n.301 (1991); Robert E. Emery,
Marriage, Divorce and Children's Adjustment 94-95 (1989); Goldstein, supra note 38, at 38;
Eleanor Maccoby & Robert Mnookin, Dividing the Child 248 (1992); Wexler, supra note 9, at
789-80.
135. Goldstein, supranote 38, at 38.
136. Berke, supranote 134, at 505 n.301.
137. Wexler, supranote 9, at 789-80.
138. See supranotes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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both parents. Changing the residential provisions will not necessarily
alleviate the conflict and it will subject the child to a significant loss139
unless the two parents will have no contact and no relationship with one
the
another. In fact, custody litigation may only serve to exacerbate
1 40
conflict between the parents, thus causing more harm to the child.
It is unclear what the trial court meant by "continued conflict." The
trial court may have used the term to refer to interference with the
residential provisions. However, if continued conflict meant interference
with visitation, the court1 4should have used the contempt statute before
resorting to modification. '
E.

The Supreme Court'sFailureTo Explicitly Justify Its Decision Will
Cloud FutureInterpretationsof the Modification Statute.

A major problem with the supreme court's opinion is its lack of clarity
regarding the basis for its decision. 42 Although the court concluded
there had been a substantial change in circumstances, it never stated what
those circumstances were. The court summarized evidence relied on by
the trial court, but did not expressly state which evidence, in its view or
in the view of the trial court, showed a substantial change in
circumstances. Similarly, the court did not specifically state why the
child's present environment was detrimental. The opinion cited evidence
to support its decision, 43 but did not make it clear how this evidence
demonstrated that Joey's present environment with Cynthia was
detrimental.
The court also failed to consider how the trial court balanced the harm
of the change in environment against the advantage of the change as
required by the statute.'" The trial court did not analyze the child's
environment when living with his father and failed to examine the harm a
three-year-old child was likely to suffer in being separated from his half139. Carla B. Garrity & Mitchell A. Baris, Caught in the Middle 70-71 (1994).
140. Wexler, supra note 9, at 791.
141. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
142. "The (trial) court thus did not abuse its discretion when it held that there had been a
substantial change in circumstances, that the child's environment was detrimental to his mental
health, and that a placement modification was necessary to serve the child's best interests." In re
Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash. 2d 604,611,859 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1993) (per curiam).
143. See supranotes 102-03 and accompanying text.
144. "The [balancing test] is especially important because it compels attention to the real issue in
modification cases. Any change in the child's environment may have an adverse effect even if the
non-custodial parent would better serve the child's best interest." Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act §
409, 9A U.L.A. 628, Commissioner's Note (1987).
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brother and his mother, who had been his primary caregiver since his
birth. 14' Although the trial court concluded that tlhe advantage of the
change outweighed the harm of the change, it did not make any findings
about what those harms were, and the suprer.ae court similarly
disregarded this part of the analysis.
In order to uphold the statute's policy of maximizing finality in
custody issues, the supreme court must give parents, their attorneys, and
the trial courts clear guidance about what factors may be considered to
meet each of the statutory requirements146 If parents and their attorneys
do not receive clear explanations from the court about how to satisfy
each requirement in the statute, it will be hard for them to determine
whether they can establish grounds for modification. Furthermore, the
supreme court must provide guidance to trial courts in how to interpret
the modification statute.
If the court does not state how each
requirement of the statute has been met or not met, tial courts will have
insufficient guidance in how to apply the statutory requirements in future
cases.1 47 This inability to predict outcomes of cases will result in more
modification petitions and more litigation.'48 Thus, lack of clarity
undermines finality, the very purpose of the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
By granting a modification in this case, the Washington Supreme
Court has undermined the fundamental policy and language of the
modification statute.
The Washington Legislature enacted the
modification statute to maximize finality in custody decisions by
145. See C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under tie Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 923, 944-45 (1989) (arguing that
the balancing test requires courts to evaluate the environment of the noncustodial parent).
146. Finality in custody decisions is further undermined by the lengthy appeals process in
modification cases. Pursuant to a court order, Cynthia transferred Joey into James's custody on
March 31, 1991 when Joey was three years old. By the time the supreme court decided this case in
October 1993, Joey had been living with his father for over two years. Thus, at the time the supreme
court was deciding this case, upholding the modification may have in fact provided stability for the
child. To balance the harm of the change in environment against the advantage of the change
becomes an analytical game not grounded in reality when the child has been in the custody of the
nonmoving parent for a substantial period of time during the lengthy appeals process. This problem,
however, should be corrected through legislative action and not judicial action. To ensure actual
finality and stability in custody decisions, the legislature should provide a means to expedite the
appeals process in modification cases.
147. See Watson, supra note 38, at 74 (arguing that judges should explicitly set down in the
record why they reached a particular result).
148. See supranotes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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discouraging modification and thereby providing stability for children.
The supreme court failed to implement these important statutory goals in
McDole by failing to read the modification statute as a whole.
Furthermore, the court arguably relied on improper factors in upholding
the modification decision. It is unclear after this case how much weight
future trial courts in a modification proceeding will give or should give
to such factors as interference with visitation, moving out of the state
with the child, and conflict between the parents. In addition, the court
also undermined the important policy of finality by failing to explicitly
justify its decision. As a result, future courts will have little guidance
and results will be unpredictable.
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